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Abstract
We provide a new protocol for Validated Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement. Validated (multi-
valued) Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement is a key building block in constructing Atomic Broadcast
and fault-tolerant state machine replication in the asynchronous setting. Our protocol can withstand the
optimal number f < n/3 of Byzantine failures and reaches agreement in the asymptotically optimal
expected O(1) running time. Honest parties in our protocol send only an expected O(n2) messages
where each message contains a value and a constant number of signatures. Hence our total expected
communication is O(n2) words. The best previous result of Cachin et al. from 2001 solves Validated
Byzantine Agreement with optimal resilience and O(1) expected time but with O(n3) expected word
communication. Our work addresses an open question of Cachin et al. from 2001 and improves the
expected word communication from O(n3) to the asymptotically optimal O(n2).
1 Introduction
Byzantine agreement is a fundamental problem in computer science introduced by Pease, Shostak and
Lamport [23] in 1980. Bracha [6] shows that even strictly weaker primitives than Asynchronous Byzantine
agreement can only be solved when the number of parties n is larger than 3f where f is the maximum
number of parties the adversary can corrupt. We therefore say that a solution has optimal resilience if it
solves Byzantine agreement for n = 3f + 1. A theorem of Fischer, Lynch and Paterson [15] states that
any protocol solving Asynchronous Agreement must have a non-terminating execution even in the face of
a single (benign) failure. Ben-Or [5] shows that randomization can be used to make such non-terminating
executions become events with probability 0. Feldman and Micali [13] show that Asynchronous Byzantine
Agreement can be solved with optimal resilience n = 3f + 1 and with an expected O(1) asynchronous
running time (where running time is the maximum duration as defined by Canetti and Rabin [10] and is
essentially the number of steps when the protocol is embedded into a lock-step timing model). We therefore
say that a solution has asymptotically optimal time if it solves Byzantine agreement using an expected
O(1) running time. We show that a recent lower bound of Abraham et al. [1] implies that any protocol
solving Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement aganst an adaptive adversary (and without a constant error
probability)must have the honest parties send expectedΩ(n2)messages (see Appendix B). We therefore say
that a solution has asymptotically optimal word communication if it solves Byzantine agreement using an
expectedO(n2)messages and each message contains just a single word where we assume a word contains a
constant number of signatures and domain values. Renewed interest in Byzantine Agreement follows from
the need to implement Atomic Broadcast and fault tolerant state machine replication in the asynchronous
setting [9, 20, 12]. In 2001, Cachin, Kursawe, Petzold, and Shoup [7] defined the problems of Atomic
Broadcast and Validated Byzantine Agreement to address these types of applications. Validated Byzantine
Agreement guarantees a decision on some party’s input satisfying a globally verifiable external validity
condition. Cachin et al. [7] show how to obtain Validated Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (VABA)
with optimal resilience, asymptotically optimal time and O(n3) expected word communication. Improving
the expected word communication for VABA fromO(n3) to theO(n2) is an open problem stated in [7] and
has been open for almost 20 years.
This paper presents the first VABA solution with optimal resilience, asymptotically optimal time whose
expected word communication is O(n2), thus closing this gap. More precisely, we prove the following
theorem:
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Theorem 1. There exists a protocol amongn parties that solves except with negligible probability Validated
Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (VABA), secure against an adaptive adversary that controls up to f <
n/3 parties, with expected O(n2) word communication and expected constant running time.
Background. In Byzantine Agreement there are n parties each of which has an input value, at most f < n
are corrupted (i.e., controlled by an adversary), and the goal of the honest parties is to decide on a unique
value. Many models with various assumptions have been proposed in the literature. Some consider asyn-
chronous communication whereas others rely on synchrony. Some restrict the adversary’s computational
power in order to use cryptographic tools whereas others assume an information theoretic model, and some
assume authenticated or private communication channels whereas others deal with possible forgeability. In
this paper, we assume the practical random oracle model [4, 14, 8]. Namely, an environment with authenti-
cated but asynchronous communication channels and a computationally bounded adversary.
A simplified version of the agreement problem is the binary agreement problem in which the inputs
of the parties are restricted to the set {0, 1}. A fundamental work by Cachin, Kursawe, and Shoup [8]
was the first to give an optimal algorithm in terms of resilience and word communication in the random
oracle model, which they formalized to fit the distributed settings. In particular, the algorithm withstands
up to f < n/3 Byzantine failures, runs in constant expected number of asynchronous views (rounds), and
the expected communication cost is O(n2) messages of the size of one or two RSA signatures [25]. A
more recent work by Mostéfaoui et al. [21] shows how to achieve the same optimal result without any
cryptographic assumptions besides the existence of a common random coin1.
As for the multi-valued Byzantine agreement, the original problem specification due to Lamport et
al. [23] was motivated by the following setting: Four computers in control of a space-shuttle cockpit need
to reach agreement on a sensor reading, despite one being potentially faulty. The problem was captured via
aWeak Validity [11] condition as follows:
Definition 1 (Weak validity). If all honest parties propose v, then every honest party that terminates de-
cides v.
Note that while theWeak Validity condition is well defined, it says nothing about a situation in which parties
propose different values, allowing them to (1) return some default value ⊥ that indicates that no agreement
was reached or (2) agree on a value proposed by a corrupted party. Mostéfaoui et al. [22] consider a slightly
stronger property in which only a value proposed by an honest party or ⊥ are allowed to be returned.
However, honest parties may still decide ⊥ if they initially disagree. In particular, it is not clear how this
slightly stronger validity property can be used to solve Atomic Broadcast [7].
Cachin et al. formulated in [7] a problem specification that captures the practical settings where parties
propose updates to a replicated state. Agreement is formed on a sequence of updates, hence a non-default
decision is needed in order to make progress. To prevent updates from rogue parties, the model is extended
with an External Validity predicate as follows:
Definition 2 (External validity). If an honest party decides on a value v, then v is externally valid.
Mostéfaoui et al. presented in [22] a signature-free deterministic reduction from their binary agreement
protocol [21] that solved asynchronous Byzantine Agreement with Weak validity. It has optimal resilience
and asymptotically optimal time and word communication. However, the weak validity property seems to
prohibit the usefulness as a building block for Atomic Broadcast or any State Machine Replication (SMR)
protocol that should maintain liveness in an asynchronous environment.
Cachin et al. gave in [7] a randomized reduction from their binary agreement algorithm [8] to VABA
and also showed how to use it in order to implement an atomic broadcast. Their VABA protocol provides
external validity, has optimal resilience, asymptotically optimal time, and expected message complexity
O(n3). That paper explicitly mentions the open problem of improving the expected word communication
from O(n3) to O(n2).
Our Contribution. The main contribution of this paper is solving this open question. Just like [7], our
protocol solves Asynchronous Byzantine agreement with external validity (VABA), has optimal resilience
and asymptotically optimal time. Improving on [7], our expected word communication is also asymptoti-
cally optimal. In particular, honest parties send a total expectedO(n2)messages, which is optimal and each
message is roughly the size of one or two threshold signatures.
1while the construction of [21] requires only O(n2) bits given a common coin, the word communication of the resulting binary
Byzantine Agreement protocol is dominated by the common random coin protocol that requires threshold signatures and O(n2) word
communication.
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Our protocol is secure against an adaptive adversary. This follows from using adaptively secure thresh-
old signatures of Libert et al. [18] and adaptively secure common coin protocol of Loss and Moran [19].
Cachin et al. [7] note that their binary protocol [8] and their Validated protocol [7] also immediately gener-
alize to be secure against adaptive adversaries by using the primitives above.
Techniques and Challenges. Our protocols are based on the Random Oracle model and draw heavily
from the framework of Cachin et al. [8, 7]. Unlike previous constrictions, our protocol does not go through
a randomized binary agreement black-box. Instead, much like Katz and Koo’s Synchronous Byzantine
agreement protocol [17], in each view, we run n parallel leader-based threads and then use a random leader
election primitive to decide which leader is elected in hindsight. Just like [17], not all honest parties reach
agreement in the same view. To guarantee safety between different views we use a view-change protocol
that guarantees that new leaders can propose only safe values.
Adopting this approach to get optimal word communication requires to overcome several challenges.
On the one hand, to obtainO(n2) word communication per view, we need each of the n leader-based thread
protocol to use just O(n) words and we need the global view change protocol to use O(n2) words. On
the other hand, to guarantee progress we make sure that our view change protocol will allow progress even
in asynchronous settings. To balance between frugal communication and liveness we adopt a four step
protocol that is inspired by an approach taken in the partial-synchrony model by Yin et al. [26].
To obtain optimal O(1) expected time, the next challenge is to guarantee that when the first honest
party enters the leader election phase there is a constant fraction of potential leaders such that if one of
them is elected then all honest parties will decide in constant time. Moreover, if the elected leader did not
complete its broadcast, we need a mechanism to allow parties to abandon the elected leader’s broadcast
before running the global view-change protocol.
2 Model
In order to reason about distributed algorithms in cryptographic settings we adopt the model defined in [8,
7]. We consider an asynchronous message passing system consisting of a set Π of n parties, an adaptive
adversary, and a trusted dealer. The adversary may control up to f < n/3 parties during an execution. An
adaptive adversary is not restricted to choose which parties to corrupt at the beginning of an execution, but
is free to corrupt (up to f ) parties on the fly. Note that once a party is corrupted, it remains corrupted, and
we call it faulty. A party that is never corrupted in an execution is called honest. We denote the set Πh ⊆ Π
to be the set of all honest parties.
We assume an initial setup before every execution in which the trusted dealer generates the initial states
of all parties, and we assume that the adversary cannot obtain the states of honest parties at any time during
an execution. In particular, the adversary cannot obtain the initial states of honest parties.
Computation. Following [8, 7], we use standard modern cryptographic assumptions and definitions. We
model the computations made by all system components as probabilistic Turing machines, and bound the
number of computational basic steps allowed by the adversary by a polynomial in a security parameter
k. A function ǫ(k) is negligible in k if for all c > 0 there exists a k0 s.t. ǫ(k) < 1/k
c for all k > k0.
A computational problem is called infeasible if any polynomial time probabilistic algorithm solves it only
with negligible probability. Note that by the definition of infeasible problems, the probability to solve at
least one such problem out of a polynomial in k number of problems is negligible. Intuitively, this means
that for any protocol P that uses a polynomial in k number of infeasible problems, if P is correct provided
that the adversary does not solve one of its infeasible problems, then the protocol is correct except with
negligible probability. We assume that the number of parties n is bounded by a polynomial in k.
Communication. We assume asynchronous links controlled by the adversary, that is, the adversary can
see all messages and decide when and what messages to deliver. In order to fit the communication model
with the computational assumptions, we restrict the adversary to perform no more than a polynomial in k
number of computation steps between the time a message m from an honest party pi is sent to an honest
party pj and the time m is delivered by pj
2. In addition, for simplicity, we assume that messages are
authenticated in a sense that if an honest party pi receives a message m indicating that m was sent by an
honest party pj , then m was indeed generated by pj and sent to pi at some prior time. This assumption is
2Note that although this restriction gives some upper bound on the communication in terms of the adversary local speed, the model
is still asynchronous since speeds of different parties are completely unrelated.
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reasonable since it can be easily implemented with standard symmetric-key cryptographic techniques [3] in
our model.
Termination. Note that the traditional definition of the liveness property in distributed system, which
requires that all correct (honest) parties eventually terminate provided that all messages between correct
(honest) parties eventually arrive, does not make sense in this model. This is because the traditional defini-
tion allows the following:
• Unbounded delivery time between honest parties, which potentially gives the adversary unbounded
time to solve infeasible problems.
• Unbounded runs that potentially may consist of an unbounded number of infeasible problems, and
thus the probability that the adversary menages to solve one is not negligible.
Follwong Cachin et al. [8, 7], we address the first concern by restricting the number of computation steps
the adversary makes during message transmission among honest parties. So as long as the total number
of messages in the protocol is polynomial in k, the error probability remains negligible. To deal with the
second concern, we do not use a standard liveness property in this paper, but instead we reason about the
total number of messages required for all honest parties to terminate. We adopt the following definition
from [8, 7]:
Definition 3 (UniformlyBounded Statistic). LetX be a random variable. We say thatX is probabilistically
uniformly bounded if there exist a fixed polynomial T (k) and a fixed negligible functions δ(l) and ǫ(k) such
that for all l, k ≥ 0,
Pr[X > lT (k)] ≤ δ(l) + ǫ(k)
With the above definition Cachin et al. [8, 7] define a progress property that makes sense in the cryptographic
settings:
• Efficiency: The number of messages generated by the honest parties is probabilistically uniformly
bounded
The efficiency property implies that the probability of the adversary to solve an infeasible problem is neg-
ligible, which makes it possible to reason about the correctness of the primitives’ properties. However,
note that this property can be trivially satisfied by a protocol that never terminates but also never sends any
messages. Therefore, in order for a primitive to be meaningful in this model, Cachin et al. [8, 7] require
another property:
• Termination3: If all messages sent by honest parties have been delivered, then all honest parties
terminated.
In this paper we consider both efficiency and termination properties as defined in [8, 7]. However, note that
when considering an adaptive adversary, it is also possible to define a slightly weaker termination property:
• Weak termination: If all massages sent by parties before they were corrupted have been delivered,
then all honest parties terminated.
Note that while any protocol that satisfies termination satisfies weak termination as well, a lower bound
for termination does not apply for weak termination. Indeed our lower bound (see Appendix B) is for
protocols that obtain the termination property. We leave the study of lower bounds for protocols with weak
termination as an open question.
Complexity. We use the following standard complexity notions (see for example Cannetti and Rabin
[10]). We measure the expected word communication of our protocol as the maximum over all inputs
and applicable adversaries of the expected total number of words sent by honest parties where expectation
is taken over the random inputs of the players and of the adversary. We assume a finite domain V of
valid values for the Byzantine agreement problem, and say that a word can contain a constant number of
signatures (see Section 2.1) and domain values. We measure the expected running time of our protocol
as the maximum over all inputs and applicable adversaries of the expected duration where expectation is
taken over the random inputs of the players and of the adversary. The duration of an execution is the total
3Called liveness in [8], but we find this name confusing since it is not a liveness [2] property.
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time until all honest players have terminated divided by the longest delay of a message in this execution.
Essentially the duration of an execution is the number of steps taken if this execution is re-run in lock-step
model where each message takes exactly one time step.
Following Cachin et al. [7], in order to show that our view-based protocol runs in an expected constant
running time and has expected O(n2) word communication, it is enough to show that:
• every view consists of R(k) = O(n2) messages that consist of one word, and
• the total number of messages is probabilistically uniformly bounded by R.
(Note that the number of parties n is a polynomial in k, and thus, so is R). This follows from the
following Lemma:
Lemma 1 (CKPS 01 [7]). Given a probabilistically uniformly bounded by T random variable X , there is
a constant c s.t. the expected value ofX is bounded by cT (k) + ǫ(k), where ǫ(k) is a negligible function.
2.1 Cryptographic abstractions
The main focus of this paper is on a novel distributed algorithms. Our protocol uses cryptographic tools as
black-boxes. To this end, we present our protocol assuming the existence of the cryptographic abstractions
as defined bellow.
Threshold signatures scheme. At the beginning of every execution, every party pi gets a private function
share-signi(m) from the dealer, which gets a message m and returns a signature-share σi. In addition,
every party gets the following functions: (1) share-validate(m, i, σi), which gets a message m, a party
identification i, and a signature-share σi, and returns true or false; (2) threshold-sign(Σ), which gets a set
of signature-shares Σ, and returns a threshold signature σ; and (3) threshold-validate(m,σ), which gets
a message m and a threshold signature σ, and returns true or false. We assume that the above functions
satisfy the following properties except with negligible probability:
• Share validation: For all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for every messagesm, (1) share-validate(m, i, σ) = true
if and only if σ = share-signi(m), and (2) if pi is honest, then it is infeasible for the adversary to
compute share-signi(m).
• Threshold validation: For every message m, threshold-validate(m,σ) = true if and only if σ =
threshold-sign(Σ) s.t. |Σ| ≥ 2f+1 and for every σi ∈ Σ there is a party pi s.t. share-validate(m, i, σ) =
true.
Threshold coin-tossing. We assume an unpredictable pseudo randomgenerator (PRG)G : S → {1, . . . , n},
that is known only to the dealer, which gets a string s ∈ S and returns a party p ∈ Π. Following the standard
cryptographic definitions, unpredictability means that if G is not known, then given evaluations of G at all
points in some set Q, the advantage in evaluatingG at a point not in Q is negligible. (See formal definition
in [8, 7, 18, 19]). At the beginning of every execution, the dealer gives a private function coin-sharei(s)
to every party pi, which gets a string s and returns a coin share σi. In addition, two public functions are
available to all parties: (1) coin-share-validate(s, i, σi), which gets a string s, a party identification i, and
a coin share σi, and returns true or false; and (2) coin-toss(s,Σ), which gets a string s and a set of coin
shares, and returns a party in Π.
We assume that the following properties are satisfied except with negligible probability:
• For all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for every string s, (1) coin-share-validate(s, i, σ) = true if and only
if σ = coin-sharei(s), and (2) if pi is honest, then it is infeasible for the adversary to compute
coin-sharei(s).
• For every string s, coin-toss(s,Σ) = G(s) if and only if |Σ| ≥ f + 1 and for every σ ∈ Σ there is a
party pi s.t. coin-share-validate(s, i, σ) = true.
Implementations. Several widely used and established implementations of these abstractions can be
found in the literature, e.g., [8, 7, 25], and few more recent ones [18, 19] provide implementations that
are also proven to be secure against an adaptive adversary. In all implementations, given an input value
of size B, the size of the returned shares (from the share-sign and coin-share functions) and the threshold
signature (the return value of threshold-sign) is B + ǫ(k), where ǫ(k) is a negligible function.
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2.2 Validated Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (VABA)
In this paper we follow Cachin et al. [7] and define a (multi-valued) Byzantine agreement with an external
function we call ex-ba-validation, that determines whether a value is valid for agreement or not. In addition,
we explicitly require a notion of quality to capture the “fairness” of the decision value. Note that the protocol
of Cachin et al. [8, 7] already obtains this Quality property.
Definition 4 (Validated Byzantine Agreement). A protocol solves validated Byzantine agreement with chain
quality if it satisfies the following properties except with negligible probability:
• Validity: If an honest party decides an a value v, then ex-ba-validation(v) = true.
• Agreement: All honest parties that terminates decide on the same value.
• Quality: The probability of choosing a value that was proposed by an honest party is at least 1/2.
• Termination4: If all honest parties start with externally valid values and all massages sent among
honest parties have been delivered, then all honest parties decided.
• Efficiency: The number of messages generated by the honest parties is probabilistically uniformly
bounded.
3 VABA with Optimal Resilience and Asymptotically Optimal time
and Communication
In this section we give a protocol for asynchronous Byzantine agreement, secure against an adaptive adver-
sary that controls up to f < n/3 parties, with expected word communication O(n2) and expected running
time O(1). Inspired by Cachin et al. [7, 24, 8] we present a modular implementation of our protocol,
which consists of three sub protocols: two broadcast primitives we call 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast
and f+1-Provable-Broadcast, and a simple and efficient leader election protocol.
3.1 Broadcast primitives
A broadcast primitive is an abstraction for a pre-defined party, which is called a sender, to pass a message
to all other parties. An instance of a broadcast primitive is identified via an id. We present two broadcast
abstractions: f+1-Provable-Broadcast and 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast, the first is a simple but useful
primitive that we use to implement the second, which in turn is used for the Byzantine agreement protocol.
In both, a sender broadcasts a messagem = 〈v, σ〉 consisting of a value v and a proof σ. The proof is pro-
vided in order to allow recipients to screen messages. Both abstractions are parametrized with an external
validation function that parties use for screening messages. These functions implement an important logic
that drive the safety properties of our Byzantine agreement protocol.
The API of our broadcasts somewhat differs from other broadcasts in the literature in two ways:
• The sender’s broadcast returns a proof σ. Informally, σ proves, via the threshold signature abstraction,
that at least f + 1 honest parties deliveredm.v.
• Parties can invoke abandon(id) to explicitly stop their participation in the broadcast protocol.
3.1.1 f+1-Provable-Broadcast
An f+1-Provable-Broadcast of a message m with identification id is denoted f+1-PB(id,m). The external
validation function of a party pi is denoted ex-sbc-validationi(id,m). f+1-PB(id,m) satisfies the following
properties except with negligible probability:
• PB-Integrity: An honest party delivers a message at most once.
• PB-Validity: If an honest party pi deliversm, then ex-sbc-validationi(id,m) = true.
• PB-Abandon-ability: An honest party does not deliver any message after it invokes abandon(id).
4Called liveness in [8], but we find this name confusing since it is not a liveness [2] property.
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• PB-Provability: For all v, v′, if the sender can produce strings σ, σ′ s.t.
threshold-validate(〈id, v〉, σ) = true and threshold-validate(〈id, v′〉, σ′) = true, then (1) v = v′ and
(2) f + 1 honest parties delivered a messagem s.t.m.v = v.
• PB-Termination: If the sender is honest, no honest party invokes abandon(id), all messages among
honest parties arrive, and the messagem that is being broadcast is externally valid, then (1) all honest
parties deliverm, and (2) f+1-PB(id,m) returns (to the sender) σ, which satisfies
threshold-validate(〈id,m.v〉, σ) = true.
• PB-Linear-complexity: The total number of messages sent by honest players is at most 2n.
The pseudocode of f+1-Provable-Broadcast appears in Algorithms 1 and 2. The sender sends a message
m = 〈v, σ〉 consisting of a value v and a proof σ to all parties. Once a party gets a message m from the
sender that passes its ex-sbc-validation function for the first time it produces a valid signature share of ν
on 〈id,m.v〉 , delivers the message m, and sends the share ν back to the sender. When the sender receives
2f + 1 valid shares it produces a valid threshold signature and returns it. If abandon(id) is invoked by a
party, it ignores all further messages of this broadcast instance.
Algorithm 1 f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification id: Protocol for the sender
Local variables initialization:
1: S = {}
2: upon f+1-PB(id,〈v, σ〉) invocation do
3: send “id, send, 〈v, σ〉” to all parties
4: wait until |S| = 2f + 1
5: return threshold-sign(S)
6: upon receiving “id, ack, νj” form party pj for the first time do
7: if share-validate(〈id, v〉, j, νj) = true then
8: S ← S ∪ {νj}
Algorithm 2 f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification id: Protocol for a party pi
Local variables initialization:
1: stop← false
2: upon receiving “id, send, 〈v, σ〉” from the sender do
3: if stop = false ∧ ex-sbc-validation(id,〈v, σ〉)= true then
4: stop← true
5: νi ← share-signi(〈id, v〉)
6: deliver 〈v, σ〉
7: send “id, ack, νi” to the sender
8: upon abandon(id) do
9: stop← true
3.1.2 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast
A4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast ofmessagemwith identification id is denoted by 4S-f+1-PB-broadcast(id,m).
The external validation function of a party pi is denoted ex-bc-validationi(id,m). 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-
Broadcast has three deliveries which we refer to as key, lock, and commit, respectively. These deliveries
satisfy similar properties to f+1-Provable-Broadcast, but where PB-provability additionally guaranteeing
that a lock delivery implies that a key delivery has occurred in at least f + 1 honest parties, and a commit
delivery implies that a lock delivery has occurred in at least f + 1 honest parties.
4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast is implemented on top of f+1-Provable-Broadcast, and consists of four
sequential invocations of f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identifications 〈id, j〉 for j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. f+1-
PB(〈id, j〉,〈v, 〈σex, σin〉〉) is invoked with two proofs: a proof σex for external validity condition of ex-bc-
validation that implements a logic of the VABA protocol, and a proof σin for external validity condition of
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ex-sbc-validation that implements a logic of the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast. f+1-PB(〈id, 1〉,〈v, 〈σex, σin〉〉)
takes σin = ⊥, while the remaining invocations require σin to be a valid output of the previous one.
When a party delivers a message 〈v, 〈σex, σin〉〉 in the j
th broadcast instance (the f+1-Provable- Broad-
cast with identification 〈id, j〉), it delivers key(id, 〈v, σin〉), lock(id, 〈v, σin〉), or commit(id, 〈v, σin〉),
respectively. When an abandon(id) is invoked by a party, it simply invokes abandon(〈id, j〉) for all j ∈
{1, . . . , 4}. We do not define and prove the properties of the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast. Instead,
we use it to describe our validated asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol, which we prove with the
f+1-Provable-Broadcast properties directly.
The pseudocode of 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast appears in Algorithms 3 and 4.
Algorithm 3 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification id: Protocol for a sender.
1: upon 4S-f+1-PB-broadcast(id,〈v, σex〉) invocation do
2: σin ← ⊥
3: for j = 1, .., 4 do
4: σin ← f+1-PB(〈id, j〉, 〈v, 〈σex, σin〉〉)
5: return σ
External validation function the for f+1-Provable-Broadcastinstances:
6: procedure EX-SBC-VALIDATION(〈id, j〉, 〈v, 〈σex, σin〉〉)
7: if j = 1 ∧ ex-bc-validation(id, 〈v, σex〉) = true then
8: return true
9: if j > 1 ∧ threshold-validate(〈〈id, j − 1〉, v〉, σin) = true then
10: return true
11: return false
Algorithm 4 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification id: Protocol for all parties.
1: upon delivery(〈id, j〉, 〈v, 〈σex, σin〉〉) do ⊲ j ∈ 1, . . . , 4
2: if j = 2 then
3: deliver key(id, 〈v, σin〉)
4: if j = 3 then
5: deliver lock(id, 〈v, σin〉)
6: if j = 4 then
7: deliver commit(id, 〈v, σin〉)
8: upon abandon(id) do
9: for j = 1, . . . , 4 do
10: abandon(〈id, j〉)
3.2 Leader election
A leader election abstraction provides one operation to elect a unique party (called a leader) among the
parties. An instance of a leader election primitive is identified via an id, and exposes an operation elect(id)
to all parties, which returns a party p ∈ Π. Formal definitions are given below and the pseoudocode appears
in Algorithm 5.
A protocol for leader election associated with id id satisfies the following properties except with negli-
gible probability.
• Termination: If f + 1 honest parties invoke elect(), and all messages among honest parties arrive,
then all invocations by honest parties return.
• Agreement: All invocations of elect(id) by honest parties return the same party.
• Validity: If an invocation of elect(id) by an honest party returns, it returns a party p with probability
1/|Π| for every p ∈ Π.
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• Unpredictability: The probability of the adversary to predict the returned value of elect(id) invoca-
tion by an honest party before it returns is at most 1/|Π| + ǫ(k), where ǫ(k) is a negligible function.
Algorithm 5 Leader election. Protocol for party pi
Local variables initialization:
1: Σ← {}
2: upon elect(id) do
3: ρi ← coin-sharei(id)
4: send “SHARE, id, ρi” to all parties
5: wait until |Σ| = f + 1
6: return coin-toss(id,Σ)
7: upon receiving “SHARE, id, ρj” from party pj for the first time do
8: if coin-share-validate(id, j, ρj) = true then
9: Σ← Σ ∪ {ρj}
3.3 VABA protocol
3.3.1 Overview.
The 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast and the leader election abstractions are used as building blocks for
our validated asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol. The protocol works in a view-by-view man-
ner, where each view consists of three phases: Broadcast Phase, Leader-election Phase, and View-change
Phase. In the Broadcast Phase, each party invokes 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast to broadcast its value.
Parties wait to learn that 2f + 1 instances of 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast have completed by return-
ing at their respective senders. Then, in the leader-election Phase, parties choose a leader pl uniformly at
random. Finally, in the View-change Phase, parties learn what happened in the elected leader’s 4-Stage-
f+1-Provable-Broadcast. If they learn that some party delivered commit(v) (and has a proof that justifies
it), they can decide v. Otherwise, they need to carefully adopt a value and continue to the next view. (more
details are in the view-change description in Section 3.3.2).
Our protocol guarantees that at least 2f + 1 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast instances complete in the
broadcast phase before a leader is chosen. If the elected leader has completed (implying that at least f + 1
honest parties delivered a commit) then even an adaptive adversary cannot prevent progress. Otherwise,
the view-change phase ensures that agreement is not violated even if a bad leader is chosen. Since the
probability to choose a leader that completed its broadcast is constant, the number of views in the protocol
is constant in expectation. More concretely, the probability to choose a completed broadcast is greater than
2/3, and thus the number of views in expectation is less than 3/2. More details on each phase are given
bellow. The pseudocode appears in Algorithms 7 and 6, and a formal proof is given in Appendix A
3.3.2 Protocol for view j
Broadcast phase. Each party broadcasts, using a 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast, the value and KEY
it has adopted from the previous views, as determined in the View-Change Phase (explained below); at
view 1, a party broadcasts its input and an empty key. Parties participate in n concurrent 4-Stage-f+1-
Provable-Broadcasts, where their ex-bc-validation function (Algorithm 6 lines 1-9) uses the external validity
condition for agreement (i.e., ex-ba-validation function), as well as a condition on the KEY as explained
below.
Each party sends a notification about the completion of its own 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast carry-
ing its output for proof. When a party receives 2f + 1 such notifications, it sends a signature share on a
“skip” message. Each party waits to obtain (either directly or indirectly) a combined threshold skip signa-
ture, forwards it to others, and moves to the Leader-election phase (even if its broadcast has not completed).
Leader election phase. Once a party enters the Leader-election Phase, it abandons all the 4-Stage-f+1-
Provable-Broadcast instances. The parties elect a leader via the leader election abstraction and continue to
the next phase as if only the the leader’s 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast ever occurred.
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From now on, we refer to the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast of the leader of a view j as the 4-Stage-
f+1-Provable-Broadcast of view j, and refers to its delivery events as the deliveries of view j.
View-change phase. In the View-change Phase of view j, parties report their deliveries from the broad-
cast of this view (the leader’s broadcast) to everyone, including a proof of delivery for each report. Each
party waits to collect 2f + 1 reports. Recall that 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast provides the following
guarantees: If some honest party delivered a commit, then f + 1 honest parties delivered lock, hence all
honest parties collect this lock in the view-change exchange. Similarly, if some honest party delivered a
lock, then f + 1 honest parties delivered key, hence all honest parties collect this key in the view-change
exchange.
All parties maintain two cross-view variables, LOCK and KEY:
• The LOCK variable stores the highest viewR for which the party ever received a view-change mes-
sage that includes a lock.
• TheKEY variable stores the highest viewR, for which the party ever received a view-changemessage
that includes a key and the key itself.
Once a party has collected 2f + 1 view-change messages, it processes them as follows. If it receives a
commit v, it decides v. Otherwise, if it receives a lock, it increases its LOCK variable to the current view.
Last, if it receives a key, it updates its KEY variable to store the current view and the received key. If it did
not reach a decision, a party adopts the value v of its (up-to-date)KEY variable and moves to the next view,
where it broadcasts v together with KEY as proof for the external validation function (ex-bc-validation).
As mentioned above, a party participates in a 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast only if the message
m = 〈v, 〈R, key〉〉 (note that 〈R, key〉 = KEY) passes its external validation test. The external valida-
tion includes a crucial key-locking mechanism (see Algorithm 6, lines 1 to 9). In particular, in view j > 1,
a party checks that the key is valid for v and R (meaning that key includes a proof that key(v) could have
been delivered by an honest party in the chosen broadcast of view R), and that the view R is at least as
large as LOCK. We prove in Appendix A that the key-locking mechanism together with the fact that parties
abandon all broadcasts before sending the view-changemessages guarantee agreement and satisfy progress.
Here we give some intuition for the proof:
• Lock Safety: If some party has a proof for commit v in view R, then at least f + 1 honest parties
previously locked (lock = R) in viewR.
• Key Safety: If some party has a proof for commit v in view R, then it is not possible for a party to
have a valid key on a value other than v in view higher than or equal toR.
• Key Progress: If some party pi is locked in view R, then at least f + 1 honest parties obtained a
key in R before sending the view-change messages of view R, and thus all honest parties will have
a KEY with view at leastR.
Communication complexity. We start by analyzing the word communication of a single view. Recall
that a word can contain a constant number of domain values and signatures. We denote by V the domain of
valid values for the Byzantine agreement. Note that every message that is broadcasted during the agreement
protocol consists of a value v ∈ V and two proofs - a proof (key) for the ex-bc-validation function of the 4-
Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast and another proof for the ex-sbc-validation function of every instance of the
f+1-Provable-Broadcasts therein. Since a proof is simply a threshold signature on a value and the broadcast
identification, we get that the size of the broadcast messages is a single word. The total number of messages
sent by honest parties in an f+1-Provable-Broadcast is 2n. Therefore, since 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast
uses 4 instances of f+1-Provable-Broadcast, we get that the number of words sent by honest parties in the
f+1-Provable-Broadcast protocol is O(n).
Our Byzantine agreement protocol uses n concurrent 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcasts in phase 1 of
every view, which brings the word communication to O(n2). The word complexity of sending the all to all
“skip-share” and “skip” messages as well as the message complexity of the leader election abstraction is
O(n2). Finally, since each party sends n view change messages, of a single word (at most 3 values and 3
proofs), we get that the word communication of the view-change phase isO(n2). In total, the word commu-
nication of a single view in our Byzantine agreement protocol is O(n2). We prove in Appendix A that our
protocol has an expected constant number of views, which implies that the expected word communication
of our asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is O(n2).
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Algorithm 6 Validated asynchronous byzantine agreement with identification id: protocol for party pi.
Local variables initialization:
LOCK ← 0
KEY ← 〈0, vi,⊥〉 with selectors view, value, proof
for every view j ≥ 1, initialize:
vj ← vi ; σj ← 〈0,⊥〉 ; L[j]← ⊥; BCdonej ← 0; BCskipj ← {}; skipj ← false
for every party pk ∈ Π initialize:
Dkey [k, j] = Dlock[k, j] = Dcommit[k, j] = 〈⊥,⊥〉
External validity for the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast:
1: procedure EX-BC-VALIDATION(id, 〈v, 〈j, σ〉〉)
2: if ex-ba-validation(v) = false then ⊲ external ABA validity check
3: return false
4: if j 6= 1 ∧ threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, L[j], j〉, 1〉, v〉, σ) = false then ⊲ validate the key
5: return false
6: if j ≥ LOCK then ⊲ check that key is not smaller than lock
7: return true
8: else
9: return false
Protocol for party pi
10: j ← 1
11: while true do
12: for all k=1,. . . ,n do ⊲ Broadcast phase
13: initialize an instance of 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification 〈id, k, j〉
14: σ ← 4S-f+1-PB-broadcast(〈id, i, j〉,〈vj, σj〉)
15: wait for 4S-f+1-PB-broadcast(〈id, i, j〉,〈vj, σj〉) to return or skipj = true
16: if skipj = false then
17: send “id, done, j, 〈〈vj , σj〉, σ〉” to all parties
18: wait until skipj = true
⊲ Leader election phase
19: for all k=1,. . . ,n do
20: abandon(〈id, k, j〉)
21: L[j]← elect(〈id, j〉)
⊲ View-change phase
22: send “View-change, id, j,Dkey [L[j], j], Dlock[L[j], j], Dcommit[L[j], j]” to all parties
23: wait for View-changemessages from 2f + 1 different parties
24: vj+1 ← KEY.value
25: σj+1 ← 〈KEY.round,KEY.proof〉
26: j ← j + 1
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Algorithm 7 Validated asynchronous byzantine agreement with identification id: messages.
1: upon key(〈id, k, j〉, 〈v, σ〉) do
2: Dkey [k, j] = 〈v, σ〉
3: upon lock(〈id, k, j〉, 〈v, σ〉) do
4: Dlock[k, j] = 〈v, σ〉
5: upon commit(〈id, k, j〉, 〈v, σ〉) do
6: Dcommit[k, j] = 〈v, σ〉
7: upon receiving “id, done, j, 〈v, σ〉” from party pi for the first time do
8: if threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, i, j〉, 4〉, v〉, σ) then
9: BCdonej ← BCdonej + 1
10: if BCdonej = 2f + 1 and “skip-share” message has not sent yet then
11: ν ← sigh-share(〈id, skip, j〉)
12: send “id, skip-share, j, ν” to all parties
13: upon receiving “id, skip-share, j, ν” from party pi for the first time do
14: if share-validate(〈id, skip, j〉, i, ν) then
15: BCskipj ← BCskipj ∪ {ν}
16: if |BCskipj | = 2f + 1 then
17: σ ← threshold-sign(BCskipj)
18: send “id, skip, j, σ” to all parties
19: upon receiving “id, skip, j, σ” do
20: if threshold-validate(〈id, skip, j〉, σ) = true then
21: skipj ← true
22: if “skip” message was not sent yet then
23: send “id, skip, j, σ” to all parties
24: upon receiving “View-change, j, 〈v2, σ2〉, 〈v3, σ3〉, 〈v4, σ4〉” do
25: l ← L[j]
26: if v4 6= ⊥ ∧ threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 3〉, v4〉, σ4) = true then
27: decide v4
28: if v3 6= ⊥ ∧ j > lock ∧ threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 2〉, v3〉, σ3) = true then
29: LOCK ← j
30: if v2 6= ⊥ ∧ j > key.round ∧ threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 1〉, v2〉, σ2) = true then
31: KEY ← 〈j, v2, σ2〉
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4 Discussion
Our protocol addresses an open problem of Cachin et al. [7] and reduces the expected word communication
from O(n3) to O(n2) against an asynchronous adaptive adversary. We also show that in the standard defi-
nition of an asynchronous adaptive adversary this expected word communication is asymptotically optimal
for any protocol that obtains the standard definition of termination (liveness) as defined [8, 7]. An inter-
esting open question is related to protocols that obtain weak termination in the adaptive setting: is there
a Ω(n2) lower bound against an adaptive adversary that is required to deliver all messages sent by parties
before they are corrupted? or does there exist a protocol with near linear expected word communication
under this weak termination property?
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Appendix A Correctness proofs
A.1 f+1-Provable-Broadcast
Note that PB-integrity, PB-validity, PB-abandon-ability, and PB-linear-complexity follow immediately
from the code. We now prove PB-provability and PB-termination.
Lemma 2. Algorithms 1 and 2 satisfy PB-termination.
Proof. Consider a f+1-Provable-Broadcast instance with identification id in which an honest sender pi
broadcasts an externally valid message m, no honest party invokes abandon(id), and all messages among
honest parties arrived. Since the sender is honest, it sent a message to all honest parties, and since all
messages among honest parties arrived, we get that all honest parties received a message from the sender
and thus all honest parties delivered a message and (1) is satisfied. For (2), note that the sender accept an
ack message only if it contains a valid share. Since there are at least 2f + 1 honest parties, the sender gets
at least 2f + 1 valid shares, and thus by the threshold validation property, it produces a valid threshold
signature except with negligble probability.
Lemma 3. Algorithms 1 and 2 satisfy PB-provability.
Consider an f+1-Provable-Broadcast instance with identification id and assume that a sender can pro-
duce two strings σ1, σ2 s.t. threshold-validate(〈id, v1〉, σ1) = threshold-validate(〈id, v2〉, σ2) = true for
some values v1, v2. By the threshold validation property, except with negligible probability, for j ∈
{1, 2}, σj = threshold-sign(Σj) s.t. |Σj | ≥ 2f + 1 and for every σ
′
j ∈ Σj there is a party pi s.t.
share-validate(〈id, vj〉, i, σ
′
1) = true. For j ∈ {1, 2}, letPj = {pi | ∃σ
′
j ∈ Σj s.t. share-validate(〈id, vj〉, i, σ
′
1) =
true}, and note that |Pj | ≥ 2f + 1. Therefore, there are at lest f + 1 honest parties in Pj , j ∈ {1, 2},
and thus there is an honest party pi that is in both P1 and P2. By the code, pi computes a share-sign(v)
at most once. Therefore, by the share validation property we get that v1 = v2 = v except with negligible
probability, which proves (1). For (2), note that an honest party deliver a message m before computing a
share onm.v.
A.2 Validated asynchronous byzantine agreement
Notations. Consider a byzantine agreement instance with identification id. All parties start at view 1, and
we say that a party completes view j ≥ 1 and moves to view j + 1 when it executes line 26 in Algorithm 6
for the jth time. We say that view j completes when at least f + 1 honest parties move to view j + 1. The
leader of view j is the party returned by the elect(〈id, j〉) invocations by honest parties at view j, and we
say that it is elected when the first such invocation returns. We say that a key = 〈j, σ〉 is valid for a value v
if threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 1〉, v〉, σ) = true, where l is the index of the leader of view j.
Consider a 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification id. For simplicity of exposition, we de-
note the deliverykey(〈id,m〉) by deliver2(〈id,m〉, lock(〈id,m〉) by deliver3(〈id,m〉, and commit(〈id,m〉)
by deliver4(〈id,m〉. In addition, the variables Dkey , Dlock, Dcommit from Algorithm 6 are called here
D2, D3, D4, respectively. We say that a 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification id completes
when f + 1 honest parties deliver4(〈id, 〈v, σ〉〉) for some σ and v, and its completion-proof is a string σ
′,
which satisfies threshold-validate(〈〈id, 4〉, v〉, σ′) = true.
Properties of the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast. The next four lemmas prove important properties
of the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast.
Lemma 4. Consider a 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification id. For every value v and j ∈
{2, 3, 4}, if some honest party gets σ s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈id, j〉, v〉, σ) = true, then at least f+1 honest
parties previously deliverj(id, 〈v, σ
′〉) for some σ′.
Proof. By the second part of the PB-provability property of the f+1-Provable-Broadcast, at least f + 1
honest parties deliver(〈id, j〉, 〈v, 〈σex, σin〉〉)with some 〈σex, σin〉 in the j
th instance of the f+1-Provable-
Broadcast. Therefore, by the code, at least f + 1 honest parties previously deliversj(id, 〈v, σin〉).
Lemma 5. Consider a 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification id. For every value v and j ∈
{2, 3, 4}, if some honest party deliverj(id, 〈v, σ〉), than
threshold-validate(〈〈id, j − 1〉, v〉, σ) = true.
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Proof. Let pi be an honest party that deliversj(id, 〈v, σin〉) for some v, and j ∈ {2, . . . , 4}. By the code,
pi delivers(〈id, j〉, 〈v, 〈σex, σin〉〉) in an f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification 〈id, j〉 and some σex,
and by its validity property, ex-sbc-validationi(〈id, j〉, 〈v, 〈σex, σin〉〉) = true. Therefore, since j > 1, we
get by the code of ex-sbc-validation that threshold-validate(〈〈id, j − 1〉, v〉, σin) = true.
Lemma 6. Consider a 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast with identification id, two honest parties p1, p2,
and two values v1, v2. For every j1, j2 ∈ {2, 3, 4}, if p1 gets σ1 s.t.
threshold-validate(〈〈id, j1〉, v1〉, σ1) = true and p2 gets σ2 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈id, j2〉, v2〉, σ2) = true,
then v1 = v2.
Proof. Consider three cases:
• j1 = j2. The lemma follows from the first part of the provability property of the f+1-Provable-
Broadcast.
• j1 = j2 + 1. Since p1 gets σ1 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈id, j1〉, v1〉, σ1) = true, by the second part of
the provability property of the f+1-Provable-Broadcast, we get that at least one honest party delivers
〈v1, 〈σex, σin〉〉 for some 〈σex, σin〉 in the j
th
2 instance of the f+1-Provable-Broadcast. By the exter-
nal validity property of f+1-Provable-Broadcast, we get that threshold-validate(〈〈id, j2〉, v1〉, σin) =
true. Therefore, by the first part of the provability property of f+1-Provable-Broadcast, we get that
v1 = v2.
• j1 = j2 + 2. Follows by transitivity.
Lemma 7. Consider a 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast instance with identification id. If the sender is
honest, no honest party invokes abandon(id), all messages among honest parties arrived, and the message
m that is being broadcast is externally valid, then the broadcast completes and returns a completion-proof
to the sender.
Proof. Consider a 4S-f+1-PB-broadcast(id,v) invocation by party pi. By the code of ex-sbc-validation, any
message is externally valid for the the first instance of an f+1-Provable-Broadcast consisting it. Therefore,
by the PB-termination property of f+1-Provable-Broadcast, pi gets σ1 that satisfies
threshold-validate(〈〈id, 1〉, v〉, σ1) = true, and thus the conditions of the PB-termination property is sat-
isfied in the second instance of f+1-Provable-Broadcast as well (〈v, σ1〉 is externally valid). So by the
PB-termination property of f+1-Provable-Broadcastagain, (1) all honest party deliver2(〈id, 〈v, σ1〉〉; and
(2) pi gets σ2 that satisfies threshold-validate(〈〈id, 2〉, v〉, σ2) = true. The lemma follows by applying the
same arguments for the remain two f+1-Provable-Broadcast instances.
Key protocol property. The next Lemma use two of the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast properties
proven above to prove a key property for both safety and progress of the protocol.
Lemma 8. Consider a view j and let pl be the chosen leader of view j. For every i ∈ {2, 3}, if an honest
party gets a “view-change” message that includes 〈v, σ〉 s.t.
threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, i〉, v〉, σ) = true, then all honest parties get a “view-change” message that
includes 〈v, σ′〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, i − 1〉, v〉, σ′) = true.
Proof. By Lemma 4, there exists a set P ∈ Πh of at least f + 1 honest parties that
deliveri(〈id, l, j〉, 〈v, σ
′〉) for some σ′, and by Lemma 5, threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, i − 1〉, v〉, σ′) =
true. By the code, the parties in P set their Di[l, j] = 〈v, σ
′〉, and by the PB-abandon-ability property
of the f+1-Provable-Broadcast, it happened before they invoke abandon(〈id, l, j〉), and thus before they
send their “view-change” messages. Since every honest party waits to receive view-changemessages from
2f + 1 = n− f different parties, we get that every honest party gets a view-change message that includes
〈v, σ′〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, i − 1〉, v〉, σ′) = true.
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Agreement proof.
Lemma 9. If a party p decide on a value v in a view j, then the LOCK variables of all honest parties are
at least j when they move to view j + 1.
Proof. Let pl be the leader of view j. By the code, since p decides v in view j, we know that p re-
ceived a “view-change” message in view j with 〈v, σ〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 3〉, v〉, σ) = true.
By Lemma 8, we get that all honest parties received a “view-change” message that includes 〈v, σ′〉 s.t.
threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 2〉, v〉, σ′) = true. Therefore, by the code, all honest parties set their LOCK
variables to j ( if it was smaller than j).
The next corollary follows from Lemma 9 and the fact that the LOCK variables are never decreased.
Corollary 10. If a party p decides on a value v in a view j, then the LOCK variables of all honest parties
are at least j when they start any view j′ > j.
Lemma 11. If an honest party p decides on v in view j, than all honest parties that decide in view j, decide
v as well.
Proof. Let pl be the leader of view j. By the code, an honest party decides v in view j if and only if it
gets a “view-change” message with 〈v, σ〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 3〉, v〉, σ) = true. The lemma
follows from the first part of the PB-provability property of the third instance of the f+1-Provable-Broadcast.
The next lemma shows that all keys for views higher than or equal to a view in which a decision on a
value v was made are valid only for v.
Lemma 12. Assume an honest party p decides on v in a view j. Than for every view j′ ≥ j, and every
honest party that gets 〈v′, σ′〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l′, j′〉, 1〉, v′〉, σ′) = true, where pl′ is the leader
of view j′, we get that v′ = v.
Proof. We prove by induction on the view number j′.
Base: j′ = j. By the code, p gets a “view-change” message with 〈v, σ〉 s.t.
threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l′, j′〉, 3〉, v〉, σ) = true. Therefore, by Lemma 6, we get that if an honest party
gets 〈v′, σ′〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l′, j′〉, 1〉, v′〉, σ′) = true, then v′ = v.
step: Assume the lemma holds for all j′′, j ≤ j′′ ≤ j′, we now show that it holds for j′ + 1 as well.
Assume by a way of contradiction that some honest party gets 〈v′, σ′〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l′ +
1, j′ + 1〉, 1〉, v′〉, σ′) = true and v′ 6= v. By the second part of the PB-provability property, at least
one honest party p1 delivers 〈v
′, 〈σex, σin〉〉 for some 〈σex, σin〉 in the f+1-Provable-Broadcast instance
with identification 〈〈id, l′ + 1, j′ + 1〉, 1〉. By Corollary 10, the LOCK variable of p1 at the begin-
ning of view j′ + 1 is at least j. Therefore, by the PB-validity property of the f+1-Provable-Broadcast
and the definition of its external validation for p1, we get that there is a view j
′′, j ≤ j′′ ≤ j′ s.t.
threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l′′, j′′〉, 1〉, v′〉, σin) = true. A contradiction to the inductive assumption.
Lemma 13. Algorithms 6 and 7 satisfy agreement.
Proof. Let party p be the first to decide, let j be the view in which p decides, and let v be the value p
decides on. First, by Lemma 11, all honest parties that decide in view j, decides v. Now consider view
j′ > j. By Lemma 12, if an honest party gets 〈v′, σ′〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l′, j′〉, 1〉, v′〉, σ′) =
true, where pl′ is the leader of view j
′, then v′ = v. Thus, by Lemma 6, if an honest party gets 〈v′, σ′〉
s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l′, j′〉, 3〉, v′〉, σ′) = true, where p′l is the leader of view j
′, then v′ = v.
Therefore, since an honest party decides on v′ in view j′ only if it gets a “view-change” message with
〈v′, σ′〉 s.t.
threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 3〉, v〉, σ′) = true, we get that if an honest party decide v′ in view j′, then
v′ = v.
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Termination and validity proofs.
Lemma 14. Consider a view j and assume that some honest party p sets its LOCK variable to j in view
j, then all honest parties set their KEY variable to 〈j, v, σ〉 s.t. key = 〈j, σ〉 is valid for v before moving to
view j + 1.
Proof. Let pl be the leader of view j. By the code, since p sets its LOCK variable to j in view j, we know
that p received a “view-change” message in view j with 〈v, σ〉 s.t.
threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 2〉, v〉, σ) = true. By Lemma 8, we get that all honest parties received a
“view-change” message that includes 〈v, σ′〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 1〉, v〉, σ′) = true. There-
fore, by the code, all honest parties set their KEY variables to 〈j, v, σ〉 s.t. key = 〈j, σ〉 is valid for v.
Lemma 15. If all honest parties start with externally valid values for byzantine agreement, then for every
view j ≥ 1, all messages broadcast by honest parties are externally valid for the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-
Broadcast.
Proof. First consider view j = 1. Since all honest parties start with externally valid values for byzantine
agreement, and since by the code of ex-bc-validation (lines 1–9 in Algorithm 6), a valid key is not required
in view 1, we get that all messages broadcast by honest parties in view 1 are externally valid for the 4-Stage-
f+1-Provable-Broadcast.
Now consider a view j > 1. Let i = max({k | there is an honest party p who’s lock = k when it begins view j}).
By the code of the external validity for 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast, we need to show that when a party
begins view j, its KEY variable is equal to 〈k, v, σ〉 such that:
1. 〈k, σ〉 is a valid key for v,
2. k ≥ i, and
3. v is an external valid value for byzantine agreement.
By Lemma 14, all honest parties set their KEY variable to 〈i, v, σ〉 when they end view i s.t. key = 〈j, σ〉 is
valid for v. By the code, after view i, the KEY variable is updated to 〈k, v′, σ′〉 by an honest party p only if
p receives a “view-change” message with 〈v′, 〈k, σ′〉〉 s.t. k > i and 〈k, σ′〉 is a valid key for v′. Therefore,
we get that (1) and (2) are satisfied. Now by the PB-provability property of f+1-Provable-Broadcast, we
get that at least one honest party delivers 〈v, σ′′〉 for some σ′′ at some instance of f+1-Provable-Broadcast,
and thus by the code of ex-sbc-validation and ex-bc-validation functions, v is an external valid value for
byzantine agreement.
The following corollary follows immediately from Lemma 15.
Corollary 16. Algorithms 6 and 7 satisfy validity.
The following observation follows from the fact that honest parties echo “skip” messages before setting
skip = true.
Observation 1. Consider a view j, which all honest parties start. If all messages sent by honest parties in
a view j arrived and some honest party sets skip = true in view j, then all honest parties set skip = true
in view j.
Lemma 17. Assume that all honest parties start with externally valid values for byzantine agreement.
Consider a view j, which all honest parties start. If all messages sent by honest parties in view j arrived
and no honest party sets skip = true in view j, then all 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcasts issued by honest
parties have completed and returned completion-proofs.
Proof. Since no honest party sets skip = true in view j, by the code, no honest party invokes abandon in
a the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcasts of view j. By Lemma 15, all messages broadcast by honest parties
are externally valid for the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast. Therefore, by Lemma 7, all broadcasts issued
by honest parties have completed and returned completion-proofs.
Lemma 18. Consider a view j, which all honest parties start. If all messages sent among honest parties
in a view j arrived and all 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcasts issued by honest parties in view j have been
completed and returned completion-proofs, then all honest parties set skip = true in view j.
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Proof. By the code, all hones parties sent a “done” message with a completion-proof (of their broadcast) to
all other parties. Therefore, since all messages sent among honest parties in a view j arrived, we get that all
honest parties sent a “share-skip” message to all other parties. Since there are at least 2f +1 honest parties,
all honest parties computed a valid threshold signature on “skip” and sent it to all parties. Thus, all honest
parties gets a “skip” message with a valid threshold signature and set skip = true in view j.
Lemma 19. Assume all honest parties start with externally valid values for byzantine agreement, and
consider a view j, which all honest parties start. If all messages sent among honest parties in a view j
arrived, then view j completed.
Proof. We first show that all honest parties set skip = true in view j. By Observation 1, if some honest
party sets skip = true in view j, then all honest parties set skip = true in view j. Now assume by a way
of contradiction that no honest party sets skip = true in view j. Therefore, by Lemma 17, all 4-Stage-f+1-
Provable-Broadcasts issued by honest parties have completed and returned completion-proofs, and thus, by
Lemma 18, all honest party set skip = true in view j. A contradiction.
It remains to show that no honest party waits forever for elect(j) to return or to a “view-change”
message from 2f + 1 different parties. Since, all honest parties set skip = true in view j, we get by the
code that they all invoke elect(j), and thus by the termination property of the leader election abstraction
we get that all invocations of elect(j) by honest parties return. Therefore, all honest parties send a “view-
change” messages to all other parties, and again, since all messages sent among honest parties in a view j
arrived, we get that all honest parties get “view-change” messages from at least 2f + 1 different parties.
Hence, all parties move to view j + 1.
Lemma 20. Algorithms 6 and 7 satisfy termination.
Proof. By applying inductively Lemma 19, we get that the number of views in the protocol is unbounded,
and thus honest parties never stop sending new messages. Therefore, termination trivially follows.
The secret sauce and the efficiency proof.
Lemma 21. Consider a view j of the protocol with identification id. If an honest party invokes elect(〈id, j〉),
then at least 2f + 1 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcasts have completed before.
Proof. By the code, if an honest party invokes elect(〈id, j〉), then it sets its skipj = true before. Thus it
got a “skip” message with a valid threshold signature. Thus, some party got 2f = 1 “skip-share” messages,
and thus at least one honest party p sent a “skip-share” message. Therefore, by the code again, there is a set
P of 2f + 1 parties s.t. for every pi ∈ P , p receives 〈v, σ〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, i, j〉, 4〉, v〉, σ).
Therefore, by the PB-provability property, for every pi ∈ P , at least f + 1 honest parties deliver a
message m = 〈v, 〈〈σex, σin〉〉〉 for some 〈σex, σin〉 in the 4
th f+1-Provable-Broadcast instance of the
4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast issued by pi. Hence, for every pi ∈ P , at least f + 1 honest parties
deliver4(〈id, i, j〉, 〈v, σin〉) , and thus we get that at least 2f + 1 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcasts com-
plete in view j.
Lemma 22. Consider a completed view j of the protocol with identification id. If the broadcast issued by
the leader of view j completed before the leader was elected, then all honest parties decide in view j.
Proof. Let pl be the leader of view j. Since the broadcast issued by pl completed before it was elected,
we get that at least f + 1 honest parties deliver4 a message 〈v, σ〉 in pl’s broadcast before sending their
“view-change”massages. Thus, since honest parties wait for 2f+1 “view-change”, every honest party gets
a “view-change” with 〈v, σ〉 s.t. threshold-validate(〈〈〈id, l, j〉, 3〉, v〉, σ) = true. Therefore, by the code,
all honest parties decide in view j.
Lemma 23. Assume all honest parties start with externally valid values for byzantine agreement, and
consider a completed view j. Then there is a probability of at least 2
3
that all honest parties decided in view
j.
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Proof. Since view j is completed at least f + 1 honest parties invoked elect(j), and let pl be the leader
of view j. By Lemma 21, at least 2f + 1 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcasts have completed before the
first honest party invokes elect(j). Therefore, by the validity and unpredictability of the leader election
abstraction, we get that the 4-Stage-f+1-Provable-Broadcast issued by the leader pl completed before it was
elected with a probability of 2f+1
3f+1
> 2
3
. Therefore, by Lemma 22, all honest parties decide in view j with
probability of at least 2
3
.
Observation 2. An honest party cannot move to view j + 2 before view j was completed.
Lemma 24. Algorithms 6 and 7 satisfy efficiency.
Proof. First note that since the number of messages sent by honest parties in an f+1-Provable-Broadcastis
at most 2n, we get that every view has O(n2) messages sent by honest parties. Denote this number by T ,
and let X be the total number of messages sent by honest parties in the protocol before all honest parties
decide. By Observation 2, Pr[X > lT ] is equal to the probability that some honest parties do not decide in
the first l views. By Lemma 23, the probability of this is less than (1
3
)l, and the lemma follows.
Appendix B Lower Bound on the number ofmessages for Asynchronous
Byzantine Agreement With Adaptive Adversary
A recent theorem of Abraham et al. [1] provides a lower bound for Synchronous Byzantine Agreement
against a strongly rushing adaptive adversary:
Theorem 2 (ADDNR [1]). If a protocol solves Synchronous Byzantine broadcast with (1/2)+ǫ probability
against a strongly rushing adaptive adversary, then in expectation, honest parties collectively need to send
at least (ǫf/2)2 messages.
The strongly rushing adaptive adversary assumed in Abraham et al. [1] can adaptively decide which f
parties to corrupt and when to corrupt them. In particular, the adversary is allowed to decide to corrupt a
party p after observing the messages sent by p in round r. In addition, after corrupting p, the adversary can
remove p’s round-r messages from the network before they reach other honest parties5.
Note that while Theorem 2 is proven for Byzantine broadcast, it immediately induces a lower bound for
binary Byzantine agreement. We now use it to prove the following lower bound
Theorem 3. If a protocol solves binary Byzantine agreement with (1/2) + ǫ probability against an asyn-
chronous adaptive adversary, then in expectation, honest parties collectively need to send at least (ǫf/2)2
messages.
Proof. If a protocol sends at most (ǫf/2)2 messages against any asynchronous adaptive adversary then it
will clearly send at most (ǫf/2)2 messages against any restricted adversary that works in the synchronous
model of communication (where any message sent in round r by an honest party must arrive by the end of
round r).
The core observation is that the asynchronous adaptive adversary has the ability to not deliver messages
of parties it corrupts. This follows from the definition of Termination - the protocol must terminate even if
some messages sent by parties that are corrupted will never be delivered. This is true even if some of these
messages have been sent before the adversary decided to corrupt this party.
Hence even when we restrict the asynchronous adaptive adversary to a synchronous message passing
model the adaptive adversary can still essentially remove messages of a party p sent in round r where r is
the round that the adversary decided to corrupt party p. Therefore the adaptive asynchronous adversary can
fully simulate the synchronous strongly rushing adaptive adversary. In particular, the adaptive asynchronous
adversary can simulate the behaviour as in Theorem 2 and cause the protocol to have an 1/2 − ǫ error
probability.
5In comparison, a standard adaptive adversary (in the synchronous model) cannot “take back” or remove p’s round-r messages to
other honest parties.
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